The effect of police practices on the rate df robbery in 35 large American cities is estimated by a set of simultaneous equations. The measures of police resources (patrol units on the street) and police activity on the street (moving citations issued) are more precise than . anything thus far available in studies of this kind and permit the use l" identification restrictions that allow stronger infe-rences about the causal effect of arrests on crime rates than has heretofore been possible. Police resources and police activity indeper'tdently affect the robbery rate after controlling for various socioeconomic factors. The political arrangements that lead to the use of aggressive patrol strategies are discussed and their effect estimated. The implications for, and limitations upon, policy are also discussed.
Summary I'
This is an attempt to estimate the effect ·of police practices on the raie of robbery in 35 large American cities and to set forth some reasons why those practices vary from city to city. Several preyious studies have dealt with police effects on crime but all have Been criticized: some for the measures used, others for the estimation procedures employed. Differences in police practices amollg cities have sometimes been explained, but usually as a result of differences in resources (expenditures on the police). We shall present data that are consistent with the view that police patrol strategies have an~ffect On the rate at which robberies are committed, that this·effe6t·is a causal one and not the result of a spuriou~stat;~tiral correlatiou1 and that the existence of a given patrol strategy is &ffectedby bureaucratic decisions as well as by levels of resources .. We conjecture that these decisions about police practices can be altered independently of expenditures on the police, within certain unmeasured political constraints.
I, I r I I. Prior Studies A number of studies have found a strollg negative correlation between the rate at which persons a.re arrested for an offense and the rate at which that offense occurs. The results of these studies are by no means unambiguous but they broadly suggest that police behavior, as measured by either clearance rates (the proportion of those offenses known to the police that are"c1eared" by an arrest) or arrest rates (the ratio of arrests for a given offense to the number of such offenses reported), affect-lithe crime rate independent of other social factors. Tittle and Rowe (1974) , for example, found that among cities and counties in Florida, the higher the clearance rate the lower the total index crime rate,* at least for those jurisdictions in which 30 percent Of more of the reported crimes are cleared by arrest. (The authors argued that there is a "tipping effect" such that differences in clearance rates only affect crime rates when the former exceed a certain minimum level.) Bailey (n.d.) reanalyzed the Florida data, looking at each major crime separately, and found that the negative relationship between clearance rates and crime rates persisted for certain offenses (primarily those committed for gain) but not for others. Block (1972) found a negativ.e correlation between cl~,rance rates and property crime rates among police precincts in Los Angeles; Phillips and Votey (1972) also found such a relationship using JI national data for .the years 1952-67, Logan (1975) compared clearance rates with reported index offenses and found, using statet\oide data for 5 successive years, a negative relationship for property crimes.
There is a problem in employing the clearance rate in measuring police effect on crime: a crime "cleared by arrest" is whatever the police say it is. Some departments and officers consCientiously report offenses as cleared only when they have taken into custody a person • The tofal index crime rate, as defined by the FBI, is the total.number of murders, mpes, robberies, aggravated assaUlts. burgle,ie., .~uto thefts, and larceni" reported to the police per 100,00(1 populalion, 1 .-------------~~------~------------~----------~'~------~,7jY;~~--------~ j, ,-;.., '0 if' against whom they have sufficiel1t evidence to bring' charge~'?Such arrested persons may, and ofterr'ltt,o{admit. that they have c9(hmitted offenses other than that forwhi¢l1 they were arrested; th~Joli(:e are entitled to count these as having been1:leared. But ogYlOusly the susPtlct will be hlfluertced by many things in admitting oJ,fu:roffenses: his memory I3nd c~agerness to boast, coufess,qr pI~ase hjlfcaptors, and the interest of the police in eliciting additional admissions (Skolnick, 196M . Clearance rates maYVary~Ubstantial1yamongdepartmen.ts for ,' . reasons having notrungto do w~th the objective probability of getting caught. ' i , . , A few studies of the polt* e£?ploy ~rres! rat~o~ rather than clearance rates. Though there I~re dlfficwtIes with thIS lrtdex as well, ' at least it introduces less measl~rement error-:-an arrest is a more or less concrete, easily counted event not dependent on the vagaries of memory and interrogation. S/joquist (1973) examined 53 middlesized American cities iiI 1968 and found that the arrest ratios for property crimes (robberies, burglaries, and larcenies) were negatively. related to the rates at which those crimes were reported, independenF of various socioeconomic factors. Wilson and Boland (J976) compared arrest ratios and the rate at which serious robberie § were recounted to Census Bureau interviewers in 26 large cities arid found the sam<t strong, negative association r1eported in other studies eveh though they used victimization surveys rather than Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime reports ..
In sum l there is a good deal of evidence that supports the assertion that differences in the risk of arrest areassceiated withdlfferences Tri the rate ofcrime~ But tiler-eare at least two difficulties that stand in , the way of drawing, any policy conclusions from this observed association, " The first is' the familiar problem known. to economists _ gs "simultaneity." Crime rates and arrest probabilities may be negatively associated either because high arrest rates cause lower crime rates ot because higher crime rates cause lowfJr arrest rates. The latter would be the case if a high and rising level of reported crime swamped police resources so that the rate at which criminals were arrested went GOwn. Crime ana arrest rates influence each other; they are "simultaneously determined. "The observed negative association) in the studies mentioned may mean either that arrests oeter crime or that crime "deters" arrestS::
The second problem arises from the f9.ct that changes in police practicesPlllY affect the crime rate through causal linkages that do not increase" the chances of being arrested. It may be. difficult or impossible to increase this pro~abllitY because the pofice have little or no control over such decisive factors as the willingness of citizens to report a crime, offer information to the police, or identify suspects.
.'
. / (' But the police may be able todM>ther things that a{fe(.<{ t~e9=ime rate and do S~7 only indirectly. or not at all, byalt~ringti1l}chances ofb~ing ~rrested.\These direct deterrence effects. depend on the num~er and activity o~ patrol officers. An offender may alter th~ ratec ~t wflich he commits c\~im.e not because th,e aCtJ.lQlvhancfL~being caught has .. increased cbut because he perceivestii~t it has, perhapstiecatrse he sees more officers than usual or more activity amongtnem.
Thus far efforts to see if c~ime rates are-affe9ted by differences In police presence-usually measured by the number of police per capita-hav~ prove.d. ull~v:ai1iI)g. Crm.l$~sectional statistical studies _ have fvund eithetnorelationsnip between police per ca pita and crime rates or aperver~ one: the greater the police presenge~ the highertne rate of'crime. But such sti.ldiesareclearlydefectiv.eirithattheydo:1lOt measure how many police are otJthe street. only howmany are on the payroll and, as we shall see, there is only a weak relationship between the si7.:e of a police fO,Tce aM, the number of officers it deploys on pa~f:>t Studies like the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment .. ~g-f!"es~ that simply increasing the n?mQerof patr()~ units in a$i}!yit' (-1ieat wtll not have any effect on cnme r~tes (KellIng eUrJf,'1.;9'"14).
Moreover, some of the ,studies that Pltrport to di~cerfiCJ;,.p¢rverse . relationship betw.een police per capita a;r.id crim~ rales (e .15:; P res~an and Carol, 1971; Allison, 1972; Pogue, 1972) fail to taKe into.acCount the obvious fact that cities hire mote·¢fficers because their-crime rates are high; in other words, ~hecaust11 direction of therelationship may be reversed.
...... _.IJ)JUb~ PC).!icentliY ~ectAi'iine rates less by how many of them are on patrol than by whilttJiey do there~.Whattney·doincludes many things in addition tQ';,itnd perhaps more 4'11portant than, making arrests. Though p~ol behavior is complex, we can distinguish two extreme strate8ics: "('l$gressive" arid "passive.;) By an aggressive strategy we,dffnot mean that the officer is hostile or harsh but rather that he maximizes the number of interventions irland ObsewAtions.of the ~2"mmunity.Jti another study, Wilson (I 968)has referred to this as the "~egruistic'~ p,~lice style. An officer follows a passive strategy when h(! rarely stops motor vehiclCS'·to is~ue c~fatiomr for moving viol~dQn~·or t.o check for stolen cars or wanted fugitlves, rarely stops a.nd questions suspicious persons, and. does not employ "decoy" or . stakeout procedures in areas with high cri.me rates, When an officer acts in the opposite manner, he is employingiiln"aggressive"strategy.o In Sa,ri Diego, a well-designed experimeult showed that one COmpOfJent of an aggressive patrol strategy-field interrogations or "stl'eetstops"-is associa!~d'\vith a significant decline in certain kinds . of cr4nes. In one area orthe city, field interrogations were eliminated, whe~'eupon the",numQei of "suppressible" crimes rose by about a third; When fieldinterrogati6ns were resumed the number of sucn ("Suppressi61~;' crim.es were defined as robbery, burgl9,ry, theft, auto tht1ft,assault, sex crim.es, malicious n1ischief, 'and (iisturbances.) There was no change in the frequen~y of suppressible cr~mes in contrql areas where field interrogation practices contivued unchanged.· The presence .or absence of field interrogations aid not, however, affect the number of arrests in the < experimental areas (BoYdstun, .1975) . So far as we know, there is n6 study ethat attf'mpts to see whether aggressive or passive patrol strategies are associated with the level of reported crime. ' . '
To achieve an aggressive patrol strategy a police executive ,:viII recruit certain kinds ofofficers, tniin them in.certain ways, and devise requirements and reward systems (traffic ticket quotas,. field interrogation obligations, promotional opportunities) to encourage them to follow the intended strategy. This11sed to be, and for many still is, the core of the concept of "police professionalism." S orne police chiefs have developed a new theory of proff!ssionalism that emphasizes community service, but the choiceof an aggressive patrol strategy is still quite common. The major problem ill testing a theory that relates crime rates and police strategies is to find valid and systematic measures of all aggressive strategy and the procedur~l'arrangements that sustain it. These data are not readily available and effofis to gather them may be hindered by the fact that many departments are unaware of, or reluctant to comment o~ '<he relationship between reward systems and patrol strategies: We have selected a measure We b,elieve is reliable, though n9J,complete proxy for the existence of an ~ggr.essi"e . . 'strategy: thenurnber of citations for moving tr.affic violation.~iiS5ued " per sworn officer. ~.' In an earlier study, one of the presen! authors (Wilsmlj1!f6'8) found that where one element of a "legalisti~'" (oraggressive) patrol style was
r~ present, other elernent/Ii wete likely to be: pres~pt as well. From out experience and that of others whom wehave{!QnsuIted, departments in our sample with high rat~&{jf traffic citl:}tions are generally,thought by both their members'ftnd outside observers to display a strong commitment to "police professionalism" as conventionally delJned.
It is possible, of course, that the police in some cities may be aggressive about enfotcing thl! tra(fic laws bu~ lax about making street stops, checking suspicious persons, or employing other specialized patrol t~chniques. We think this unlikely, and we believe , ou.r ~tatisticaJ rr~ults, taken as,;;.3 whole, suggest that this is not generally thee'case, but the reader should be aware that this is &' possible limitation 011 the study. We~1ta1riii~~~ti;~t; i~ two ways the possible effect of PQl1~~ practic(~s on crime. First, we shall asle Whdetber patrol strategt~dffect'
"",;.;:._' :;:: the probability of arrest for robbery an whether this prgl!&'Oillty in :,~:>",., tutn affects the rate at which robberies are committed.{W~,::Seleete(l'· robberyJ'Qrexamination because we, and probably rtloft citizenS,;
think it iii'espe.c1ally serious and fearsome offense.) In;this first line of iI1quiry we assume that the probability of an arrest for any given robber is affected by, among oth~r thiI1gs. the level of police resources (measured by the number of patrol units on the street percapitA)and the degree of aggressiveness of those units (measured by tIle mitn.ber of moving traffic citationf'! issued per patrol uni~k;:B&ause the number.of arrests that can be made will be constrained.6y the number of patrol units available, it is possible that a!iynegative assoCiation, betwe.en rQbbery rates and arrest raj~£ c;in, have either of two " meanings; high rates of robbery havt"swaniped" police resources or high rates of arrest have low.ere0' the robbery rate. We therefore::
.,
es~imate the effect ?f p~lige 'si~ategie~ on arrests a~~ of arrests 5>' n /.i cnme bymeans,of simultaneous equatlon~ that explICitly take PQllctf' resources int.oaccollnt. The model we estimate contains four separate equations: a crime rate equation that measures the eff~ct of arrest rates on drime rates; an arrest PEOductivityequation iliat gieasures the e(fect of an aggressive strategy, resources, and crime levels on arrest' rates; a poliCe deployment equation that::e1r;plains the number " " ' of patrol units (per 100,000 popUlation) on the ~te~t; arid a reS:our~",~:::.:;~·', " equation that explains the number of police employ·~es.'Li~~rn:$st'
.economic models of police behavior, this ollfLasstlmes that communities respond to Incre<;sed crime rates~!?Y;btifiigmore police in the expectation that such hiring willlea9rt §v.frl'Inciease in the arrest rates and a concomitant r~!tucti{)!l w'cri~e. According to the , economic view of arre~tpf,Q(fuctivity, whatactua~ly bappensdepentfs on how fast andt.owllat extent police resources are increased relative to the crime nite~ If the inc£eas.e in th~nurp.ber of police i~ not, if ~; " : . -pro)tortional to the' increase in the crime rate, ,or the hiring and training of additiQual police. ·officers takes a significant amount of " time to implentent, an increase in crime results in an overload on the police and a decline, in _ arrest rates and deterrence,at k.a,st , temporarily. In this model, departmental choice of a patrol strategyis vif!wed not as a response to high br rising crime rates or to community demands that the police do something about crime, but rather as an organizational 'decision influenced by fa~tors unrelated to crime; these latter will be investigated in a later section. ,In estithating' models of this sort where two variables, X and Y, are thought to affect each other mutually it becomes necessary to make _defensible assumptions that there are additional factors that will affect one of the variables but not the other. These assumptions, called "idehtification restrictions:~ insure that the estimating., techniq~es can separate the effect orX op Y from the effect ofY on X: -In the plIC."iCnt mse, sincewe are partii:ularly interest,ed in identifying tbe detert?nt effect of arrests on crime, tli~crit{cal identification rC(i1tric:;tion . is a justifiiible assum~tion that there ate: one or more "factors that affect the arrest rate but notthe crime rat~\{Nagin, 1971; ,-, .fisher and Nagin, 1976 ). If such factors can be found, we can develop logically.atidempi~Uy ~eparate equations to estimate the deterrent effect of arrests. We are then erititiefii:oaYcthat the observed negative associaticm between the crime rate and the-arrestlate cannot be wholly the result of crimes overloading the police becams-e(!ther factors, independent of the ctiI!le rate, also determine the arrest rate.
Orawh:g on our analysis in the preceding section, we suggest that the arrest ralio is affected by the choice ofa patrol stratf:gy, whioh is itself the result of various organizational and political decisions that -, are indepel1~ent of the crime rate. We 0'0 not meafh that police r--.".aO.1l1,inistrators create and, sustain an aggressive patrol strategy withot1tresardJojts~ffe(:t~\}~.crime~they will certainly justify it on-r~,that ground, among others. Rath~r, we argue that. a citts patrol l "~'0:. strategy cannot be predicted from its crime rate but can be explained f'~,,,, ' .. "''''' by the political arrangement'> (governmental structure and animating --~" "~!l) within which police d~cisiGns are made. In an earlier study, we ' " crude~;;wproximated these independent "police strategy" factors by ~~,~ a s!lbjectN~rneasure of "police effectivelless:' as judgetL-hy ~u!sid~o=o ~o" .oObserve~~ a~if-~und. timt it w~s signif!cantly, and negatively, cortelated-\Vlth tli~,pme rate (Wilson and Boland, 1976) . . We assum~-jn eStim~g this model, that patrol strategy affects the robbery rat~ll~y by cba.Qging the probability that an arrest will . ';;. . be mad,e. It is ~Sy"'---t~ see '1toW this might occur .. By stopping\ .",~~.....,questionihg, and othei'Wis~. cr6sely~bserving citiiens, especially ~~uspicio.l,1s ones,-the police al'eJnore likely to find fugitives, detect contraband (such as stolen prop~ or concealed weapons)k~nd '" ' I 1";-
.
1 " f! apprehend. persons fleeing from.:tne scene·.of.a.crime. But it is also possible that an aggressive patrol strategy will affect the crime rate directly, and notJhrough its effect on the arrest rate, if itleads wouldbe offenders to believe' that their chances of being arrested have increased, even though they have not. If this <recurs, then patrol strategy cannot be used to identify the crime rate by excluding it from . the crime-rate equations, and thus we will no~ beable to say whether a higher arrest rate will drive down the robbery rate or a higher robbery rate will drive down the arrest rate. We know of no way to demonstrate the validity of our assumption, though we believe it is reasonable, for'w~ have no information on the perceptions of wouldbe offenders and find It difficult to imagine how one would acquire . such information.
To deal with this problem we shall develop Ii second line of inquiry based on the assumption that patrol strategies may affect crime rates indirectly or directly-that aggressive patrolling reduces robberies either by increasing the actual chances of being caught or by misle~aing would-be offenders into helieving that this has happened. In designing this model, we shall arguethattbis has happened. In designing this model, we shall argue that the effect of patrol strategy on crime does not face the problem of simultaneity and thus can properly 'be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The first model is a set of four equatiQns estimated using 1975 .data gathered from 35 large American cities. The source of the published data is given in the Appendix. The unpublished data (patrol units on the street per capita and the number of moving traffic citations issued per patrol unit) were gathered by the authors from the cities fn the sample. The results, estimated using two-stage least-squares procedures, are presented in Table 1 . I R' are MI a valid ltiell$uie of goodness of Ilt in simultaneoU$ equallon models estimated by IWO .. t8g. lea.,t squa", •. Th~y a", reported as an item of inte",", to many read ..... , I·ratio: llatio <If estimated coefficient'. to asymptomatic stand"d errors.
. ;~-''''', ----~----~--Equation lea) states that the rate at which robbery occurs is a function of sanctions (the arrest ratio for robbery), demography (the proportion of males ages 15-29 in the population, the proportion of the population nonwhite, and the unemployment rate), and opportunity (population density). Equation 1 (b) states that the arrest ratio used in the preceding equation is a function of aggressive patrol (moving violations cited per patrol unit), the level of police resources relative to crime. or workload (crimes per patrol unit) and demography (proportion of population nonwhite). Equation l(c) states that the number of patrol units on the street (per 100,000 people) is a function of the level of police resources (number of sworn officers per 100,000 people), the proportion of officers assigned to two-officer cars, the housing density of the city, and. popUlation. Equation I(d) states that the level of police resources is a function of the 'rates of property and personal crime, available municipal resources (equalized property tax base per capita), the cost of ad ding additional police manpower (the starting salary of sworn officers), and a northeast regional dummy variable to control for the frequently observed tendency of large cities located in the northeast to spend more on municipal services.
The re~ults are consistent with expectations. Controlling for demographic and opportunity variables, the robbery crime rate is strongly and negatively correlated with the robbery arrest ratio. This, in turn, is affected by both the deployment measures and the workload. variable. The number of patrol units on the street is affected by t.he number of officers, the proportion in two-officer cars, and the pqpulation of the city. Police resources are determined by the rate of personal crime (but not by the rate of property ~rime) and by the available tax base.
. Alternative versions of the crime equation I(a) were estimated using different ,socioeconomic variables, induding measures of income distribution, poverty, proportion offamilies on welfare, and the like. These other variables were not statistically significant and did not increase the explanatory power of the model. The unemployment variable is included in equation lea) though it is not significant; other economic vari~bles do even less well (to our surprise).
. Many of the cities with an aggressive patrol strategy are located in the western part ofthe United States. Cultural factors associated with region may have an effect on arrest ratios independent of an aggressive patrol strategy. To insure that the moving citations variable is not~::iust a proxy for these other factors, we inserted in equation l(b) a regional dummy variable. This regional control variable is not significant.
We have re!,eated this~ analysis for two other crimes, burglary and lO r .' ' auto theft, but without obtaining significant results for 1975 data. The poor' results for burglary do not surprise us: it i~ a crime of st(lalth; rarely has eye-witnesses,. leaves few clues,and is not visible to pdlice patrol. The results for auto theft are harder to explain, since we . hdd expected this to be a patrol-suppressible crime, The same model was estimated using 1970 crime and arrest data for auto theft. and the results were as predicted and quite robust: the auto theft rate was ~tronglyand negatively associated with the auto arrest ratio, which was strongly and positively associated with the rate at which moving citations were issued. W It do not know why high arrest ratios lowered the auto theft rate in 1970 but not in 1975, nor why aggressive patrolling increased the arrest ratio in 1970 but not in 1975. On~ possibility is that by the early 1970's an increasing proportion of cars on the road were equipped With steering locks and other antitheft devices. These devices will not defeat a professional auto thief but they will frustrate, or at least discourage, casual thieves, mostly juveniles seeking joy-rides rather than income (Zimring, 1975) . The proportion of juveniles among persons arrested for auto theft began to decline in the early 1970's, prob.ably as a result oftheir decreased participation in the crime. This pattern may bave, proceeded unevenly, with a different mix of professional alld casual auto thieves in different cities. S I,lch a trend could explain the decline between 1970 and 1975 in the sensitivity of auto theft rates to arrest ratios and patrol meth6ds. ' . ' Equation l(b} sugg;sts that the arrest ratio is influenced\by both the level of resources (crimes per patrol unit) and how those resources are deployed (moving citations per sworn officer). Defining police resources in terms of patrol units on the street eliminates the paradoxical findings qf other studies that use police expenditures of total police p~rsonnelas indices (cf. Gl:eenwood and Wadycki; 1973; Swimmer, 1974.; Phillips lind Votey, 1972b) .Thereason some of these latter studies reach the implausible conclusion that police resources either nave no effect on crime rates or a perverse effect is that the correlation in pur sample between the total number of sworn officers and the number of patrol units on the street at a given time is only 0.48; iftwo extreme cases are eliminated (Boston and Washington, D.C.), the correlation falls to 0.24. ,Equation I(c) suggests that the number of patrol units per capita will depend on the number of sworn officers per capita, the proportion of the fo:'ce assigned to two-officer rather than one~('fficer cars, and the population of the city (the larger the city, the smaller the proportion of the force on the street). A police administrator cannot . easily increase the size ,of his or her force (city councils and mayors will have something, often negative, to say about that) but can, in principle, decide what proportion of the Plltrol force will be in two-officer cars. And that decision, as suggested by Equation l(b), may have an important effect on the ratio of arrests to robberies.
The total size of the police force (sworn officers per 100,000 persons) is largely explained in Equation l(d) by the rate of crimes against the person, and the funds available (per capita tax base). Other th,ings being equal, cities with a higher rate of personal crime (homicide, rape, assault, robbery) will devote more resources to police services than those with lower rates; cities with larger tax bases will employ more officers per capita than cities with smaller bases. Officers' starting salary, the rate of propery crime, and the region in which the city is located are less important explanatory factors as indicated by the low value of the associated t-ratios.
In sum, t}l~1~sults of the simultaneous equations are consistent with -the -following theory: Cities that experience high .rates of . personal crime and have higher than average tax bases will hire more police employees in proportion to iheir populations. That it should be the rate of personal, not property, crime that generates this response is understandable: personal crimes apparently induce greater anxieties and thus fuel political demands in a way that property crimes, such as burglary and auto theft, do not. Some departments assign a high proportion of officers to patrol in one-man patrol cars and encourage tbf:m to adopt an aggressive patrol strategy, as evidenced by their tendency to issue disproportionately high numbers of traffic tickets for moving violatio!1s. These patterns of deployment and behavior increase the arrest ratel-.. for robbery. We would expect to find that police in such "aggressive" departments· also make many "street stops" or field interrogations of suspicious persons, have a quicker than usual respoQse tinle to citizen calls for service. and resort to arrest in a larger proportion of police-citizen encounters. . In those cities that manage to produce higher arrest ratios by employing an aggressive patrol strategy or increasing the number of patrol units, the robbery rates are lower than one would predict knowing only the socioeconomic compo~ition of the city and the density of crimillill opportunities. Thus, citizens do not necessarily have to spend more money to get more law enforcement; they can get it by having police organizations capable of devising and maintaining a personnel; incentive, and management system that delivers more law enforcement (Leibenstein, 1976) .
tIl. Explaining Patrol Aggressiveness
In addition to deciding what proportion of his personnel to put on the street and to deploy, in one-officer units, the police administrator can choose a patrol strategy that will have an effect on arrest ratios independent of resources levels, and thus (if one accepts the assumptions stated earlier in this paper) on robbery rates.
On the basis of prior research (WiIson,1968), we suggestthat cities Wit!1 a certain political culture will be more likely to select and support police administrators strongly c0111mitted to conventional doctrines of "police. professionalism," among which will be an aggressive patrol strategy. By "political culture" we mean those widely shared expectations about how issues will be raised, governmental objectives defined, and the adniinistration of public affairs conducted. One such culture, frequently described in the literature of urban politics, is what is loosely called "good" or "reformed" government (Banfield and Wilson, 1963) . Among. the attitudes contributing to this culture are the belief that the "best person" should be hired to perform each administrative job, even if that person is politically an out!;!ider; that police administrators should not be subject to political interference so long as they act in accordance with prevailing professional doctrine; and thal''Pug!ic decisions ought to be made on the basis of what is best for thee community "as a whole" and should not favor particular neighborhoods, constituencies, or interests (Wilson and Ballfield, 1964.1971) . Historically, this political culture has been institutional-i~ed iq the council-manager form of government operating on the basis of nonpartisan, at-large elections. At any given time, th~ cqlture wHl most likely animate such institutions when they are placed in the hands of a "professional" city manager-someone with advanced training in urban management an.(! experience in governing other cities-in shari, a specially trailJf.!d cosmopolitan.
Since we cannot measutedirectly the presence of attitudes that 13 .1
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Elastici~ t-statistk. Melhod: Ordinary lea .. ,quar«. ------------~--~----~----~~ correspond to a particular political culture without costly opinion surveys, and since the mere ptesence of nonpartisan, council-manager institutions may tell one little about how decisions are really made,we take as our measure of the underlyil1g political culture the presence of a "professional" city manager. In an earfier study, Wilson showed that police forces in such dties were mote likely to have high arrest rates in those routine cases-larceny, drunkenne1Js. driving while intoxicated, disorderly conduct, and simple assault-that an officer could ea-sHy ignore or handle by means other than an arrest should be Wish to do so (1968: 27S}~ c ' We now wish to see if OUr "political culture" variable-the presence of a professional city manager-can help us explain why some of our large cities have an aggressive patrol strategy as measured by the· number of moving traffic violations cited pel" sworn' officer. In Equation 2 we suggest that moving citations are a function of opportunity (the number of automobiles per capita) and politics"" (whether or not the city has a professional city manager) (see Table ~ ). We also test the possibility that aggressiveness is stim1J1;:o.ted-by polIce reactions to the presence ofa large number of nonwhites; it is possible that the police might stop, question, and ticket nonwhites out of prejudice or suspicion.
The results of ordinary least squares regression are aboatas· predicted. Both opportuni,ty and poliotica!· cuittire·· contribute significandy and ifldependently to high rates of traffic ticketing. The correlation with proportion nonwhite is not significant.
In sum, a city with a "refo::med" or professionalized municipal management system will be more likely to have a police department with an aggressive patrol strategy, though not necessarily one with many patrol units on the street: Aggressiveness and a larger number of patrol!l9Jts, separately andin combination, will lead toa higher arrest ratlo for robbery, and this higher ratio, in turn, leads to a lower robbery crime rate. We no.w relax somewhat the assumption we madeatthe outset that, aggressiveness lowers the crime rate by cha~~ging the probabi!ityo{ arrest for that crime. Suppose that aggressiveness also affects crime ~ .. ~o .flj!~!y-o.b.y·~making.~w~d-hr> .nfferulcrs ~mm-Jl_ajlprehe~sive of the . cbances of being arrested, whether or not this pioDabTIitymts~lr~=~=--__ ... __ increased. There is no way we can test the extent to which police activity affects crime through direct rather than indirect deterrence. But we do not believe that such a test is necessarywveri our purpose, which is to show the effect of police practices' on robbery rates with.out the precise ca usal nexus. The model ~8timated in Equation 1 . is consistent with both theories. Police practices do~ffect crime rates, directly or indirectly and these practices~ie, so far as We cali tell, the product of decisions made over the long tetm and not in response to. .. ii , -short-term changes in crime rates or resource levels. '...
In our earlier study we used a different and admittedly m:ore sUbjective measure of police style: three expert judges rated 23 higcity police departments"professiofial" or "nonprofessional" in t(trms.",~ of their adherence to norms ofeffi~iency and legalism. We entered this rating as ~ dummyvafrab1e in an ordinary least squares eqllation that estimated the rate of serious robberies. We repeat there~ults in_ Table 3 . Table 3 Estimating 
The consistency between thisJ1lod~l atiJthe one presented earlier in this paper, despite the use ofdiffer;~nf measures of the crime rate and of police style, strengthens our confidence that the police do make a difference and that this is ~mt entirely dependent on resources. IV. Does· It R.~allY' WorkThatWay?
Two things are missing from this study that would be important to anyone wishing to Ghange police practices in order to cha nge arrest rates. First, this study looks at 1l!any cities during one year whereas C tnore might be learned by ldoking at a few cities over time. Qifferellces among cities may be the result of underlying factors we have not measured or factors that, if measured, would prove quite resistant to change. Int could be shown, however, that in several cities the arrest rate changed over a5-or to-year period and thattJ:>Js " was associated with changes in the crime rate (controlling for popUlation change), then we could be more.confid~nt both that the correlation between crime and arrests is real and that We can change the former by changing the latter. Second, this study does not investigate in detail how arrests are made or what happens on patrol when different strategies are employed. This sort of fine-grained analysis would be particularly valuable but it is especially hard to carry out. The day-to-day work of the patrol officer. is no more visible to the academic observer thanit is }?
::
. to the police administrator. Ideally, we would like syst.ematic ., . knowledge about the circumstances confronting an officer whenever . lte encounters an opportunity to make a street stop or an arrest, . ] together with di::tailed, infonnation,~J}';kkWnat the officer di~i.lmd the PI result; Obviously, stich jpformation would be very difficult to coilect.u<~;:' Unpublish.M'" dflfa' gathered by researchers. frp;p the Police .. :,'.c-: FOl.mdati6nare suggestive but permit fewrlefirtite conclusions_ FQ~';'::' ' two large-cities, all thearrests,for l1laJor' property crimes Jr~~gefY'~'> .burglary, !arc~ny from the person) and str~nger-to-stranger c.ti'cties of violence (aggravated assault)~ere tabulated for a peripd of time, together with available lnrormation on what the officer was doing . just before-the arrest and what happened to the arrestee after he was ,brought to the station. In one city, nearly 60 percent of the arrests occurred when an officer an~wered a call for help. About 60 percent of the arrests were dismissed before b(!ing' preserited to the nzr prosecutor, usually for ladt of sufficient evidence: Wh!!-Us mgst '.' intriguing is that officers differed greatly in the extenllo wIiich their . _:.~.c_ .~ ~ arrests survived this review process: of those officers who made 30r.:....--c-more arrests, aU the arrests made by 31 officers went to pros~.cutfbn, Whereas llone of those made by 89 officers were.prose.cllted. In Washington, D.C., another study found thatfewe(tbanlO percent of theoffic.:ef8"made over hai~' the arrests; indeed,9 accounted for more arrests thah 450 of their fellows (Forst, COx, and LuciallOvic, W77) .
What explains these differences and whether Wf, can chanaeJh~,_ ~,,~:_.". ~.:.;.c _,'.'; behaviot of offjc;ers who make few aE!estSfGl' whose"arrests ( 
I~
Two studies of police responst time contain sortie eviCfence that . aggressiveness can make a differ~nce. Isaacs (l967) .studyingthe Los Angeles police, and Clawson and; 'Cbang (1975) ;studying theSeaUle ~~-.,.
police, came'to llimilar conclusiqns: a greater proportion of patrol unit'responses to citizen calls resulted in arrests as resp6nse time decreaSed. There are lim.il$f of course, to hownJ:!fchthe, arrest I productivity of po]jceurt~~s caJl he-raised by accel~,atiitg their , ..
' . , -0'=-"" ~-•• 1;~PQ.~~.;,.~:;()nc!?! a' certain minimum has berCIl' achieveu (roughly 3 , minutes)1 differences in re$ponsetime cease to affect arrests.* We believe that our ofiudies, tC;1gether with other resea.rch findings, are ( .. ~onsiRterlt with the :view that police activity can reduce the rates of , . some serious property crinib, and at least offer a compelling case for experiment desigried to tes~ this conclusion and identify the processes ' . by which arrest rates can 'be increased. ii Suppose that statistical s~udies_and eXperiments do confirm our beliefs. A police chief may stilI be unable 10 obtain the additional resources or change his deployment strategy so as to achieve more· aggressive patrols and ;higher arrest ratios. It may turn out that the principal \:onstraints on arrest ratios are .community attitudes that the police cannot alter: citi;zens may bl ~olerant of minor crimes, reluctant to call the police or offer evidence, unwilling to report suspicjous activitiel! or assist officers in pursuit of suspects, or irritated by frequent street stops and high rates of traffic tickets. Police unions may successfully resist efforts to redeploy the patrol force so as to pu~.more units on the street in high~risk periods (such as the evening) or more officers in one~officer patrol cars. For though a recent, carefully executed experiment suggests that officers who., patrol alone produce as many arrests, and are as safe, as those who patrol with a partner (BoYdstun et aI., 1977) . we are not optimistic that police who believe differently will be persuaded ~ its evidence.
We cannot offer any advice on how to deal with these ptoblems.
Social scientists can, ideally. tell practitioners what will happen if some changes are made, but they can rarely give scientific guidance about the political and human processes that might bring about these changes. Indeed, social scientists are likely to ignore or underestimate the unanticipated cons~quences-both good and bad-of any change. especially since the studies they, conduct (like this one) typically consid~r Qoly two kinds of results-crime rates and pplice practices. ., , 20 Appendix '.'
I. The Samp~~~
Equations 
